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The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD)is an independent institution established interms of section 53 of the South African
Police Service Act 1995 (Act No 68 of 1995). In an
effort to ensure that those police officers that do not
uphold the rule of law are held accountable for their
actions, the ICD makes recommendations as to how
these officers should be dealt with, both
departmentally and criminally. 
When members of the ICD approached the Institute
for Security Studies (ISS) during 2006 they were
particularly concerned that resource shortages,
deficiencies within its legal mandate and procedural
guidelines, as well as poor ICD/police relations in
some areas were having a negative impact on the
ICD’s ability to achieve its constitutional objective.
This objective is to ensure that complaints in respect
of offences and misconduct by members of the
police are investigated in an effective and efficient
manner. The researchers accordingly formulated
the following objectives for this project:
• To develop a clear understanding of the 
relationship between the ICD and the police
• To examine the processes and procedures used 
by the ICD to present its recommendations
relating to disciplinary or administrative action,
as well as recommendations pertaining to
criminal matters dealt with by the Directorate of
Public Prosecutions 
• To establish the general level of compliance by 
the police with recommendations by the ICD
• To evaluate the impact of recommendations by 
the ICD
• To identify possible reasons for non-compliance
• To make recommendations that would address 
areas of non-compliance
The rest of this article will take a look at methods
used in the study, the legislative mandate of the
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ICD, the findings and recommendations of the
study and, finally, important lessons from
international experience.
Methodology
The researchers adopted a combination of
quantitative and qualitative research methods for
this study. The quantitative component of the
study consisted of an analysis of 573 case dockets
of substantiated and closed cases in all nine
provinces. These are for complaints lodged with
the ICD since its inception in 1997. The research
team focused only on CLASS I (death in police
custody or as a result of police action), CLASS III
(criminal offences committed by members of the
police), and CLASS IV cases (less serious
misconduct committed by members of the police). 
The qualitative component of the study consisted
primarily of structured interviews with the ICD
provincial heads and SAPS provincial
commissioners (or senior officials delegated by
them). In total, eight ICD provincial heads and
five SAPS provincial commissioners constituted
the qualitative sample for the study. In addition to
the structured interviews, the researchers
conducted limited research to determine lessons
learnt from international experience such as
provided by the report of the Commonwealth
Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) in 2005.
Legislative mandate of the ICD
The legislative origin of the ICD can be traced
back to section 222 of the Interim Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No 200 of
1993) and section 206 (6) of the 1996
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. As a
consequence of the provision in the interim
Constitution, section 53 of the South African
Police Service Act, 1995 provides for the
establishment of an Independent Complaints
Directorate and its functions. In order to achieve
this objective the Directorate is given, among
others, the following powers (section 53 (2)
(a)–(c):
• To investigate any complaint of misconduct or 
offence against any member of the police (or
to refer such an investigation to the police and
to monitor that investigation)
• To investigate any death in custody or as a 
result of police action
• To investigate any matter referred to it by the 
Minister or the relevant member of the Executive
Council
• To make recommendations to the relevant 
police commissioner 
Probably the biggest weakness in the legislation is
the absence of a legal obligation to compel the
police to comply with the recommendations of the
ICD in terms of disciplinary action against members
accused of misconduct. In contrast, the Domestic
Violence Act, 1998 (Act No 116 of 1998), section 18
(4), extends the mandate of the ICD to police
misconduct in relation to the latter Act and, unless
otherwise directed by the ICD, the police must
institute disciplinary proceedings against any
member who failed to comply with an obligation
referred to in this Act.
Findings and recommendations of the study 
For purposes of clarity and conciseness the findings
of this study are discussed under sub-headings in line
with the research objectives. 
Relationship between the ICD and the police 
The relationship between the ICD and police
management in the provinces is generally good,
although the same can not be said about middle and
lower level staff in the two organisations. There is
evidence of poor personal relationships in some
areas, mutual distrust, perceptions of an attitude of
superiority by the police vis-à-vis the ICD, and a
perceived reluctance by some police managers to act
against members, notwithstanding ICD
recommendations. The ICD appears to distrust the
police to the extent that only about 30 per cent of
the cases that are reported to it, are referred to the
police for investigation or further investigation. These
include cases of misconduct. It would probably have
made more sense, especially in view of the growing
numbers of the police and the resource limitations of
the ICD, to refer more investigations to the police,
closely monitored by the ICD. 
In addition to these factors relations between the ICD
and the police are also negatively influenced by the
following conditions:
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• Based on some of the views expressed during 
the structured interviews, it would seem that the
independence and credibility of the ICD is
compromised by its location within the
Department of Safety and Security, and the fact
that it has to report to the Minister who is also
the Minister responsible for the police (viz.
conflict of interest). The concern here is that the
Minister, in his endeavours to protect the image
of the police, might not always be objective
when he is required to take decisions on
recommendations by the ICD that may
negatively reflect on the police.
• The lack of legal authority for the ICD to 
compel the police to report back on whether or
not the ICD recommendations were
implemented, or to provide documented
reasons for non-implementation.
• The general practice by the police not to 
respond to written communication from the ICD
or to respond irregularly.
• The absence of a prescribed coordinating 
mechanism between the ICD and the police,
which leaves liaison between the two
organisations to personal arrangements.
• The ICD is frustrated by the police practice of 
waiting for the conclusion of a criminal trial
against an accused member before they
consider the possibility of departmental steps
against that member. It is also not always certain
who in the police is responsible for such
decisions or for implementing ICD
recommendations.
Processes and procedures used by the ICD
A number of shortcomings were found in the way
that dockets were kept at most of the provincial
offices of the ICD. In most of the dockets there was
incomplete or missing information, and many case
files were closed without any indication of the
outcome of criminal or disciplinary proceedings.
Part of the reason for this is that the criteria used for
the closing of substantiated cases is not always
clear and it appears that there is no uniform way in
which this is done in the provinces.
ICD resources
The ICD is severely understaffed, especially when
considering the rapidly increasing numbers of
police members and the fact that the ICD
investigates, on average, just over 5 000 cases per
year. In addition, the effectiveness of investigators is
marred by insufficient resources such as vehicles. A
work-study report done by the Department of
Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in 1997
allocated 535 posts to the ICD, including 339 posts
for investigators. By 2007, ten years later, the ICD’s
staff complement stands at 247, less than half the
recommended number. Some progress has been
made with the setting up of two satellite offices in
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, but even with
these offices, the ICD simply does not have enough
resources to carry out its mandate effectively.
The level of police compliance
The level of police compliance with ICD
recommendations relating to Class I cases (deaths
in police custody or as a result of police action)
appears to be relatively high. This is probably the
result of the legal obligation that the police have to
inform the ICD of deaths in these instances.
Furthermore, these deaths are matters for the courts
and the police have virtually no influence on the
outcome of these cases. 
However, Class IV cases (misconduct) seem to have
the highest frequency of non-compliance. Even in
cases where the police do comply with ICD
recommendations to take departmental action, a
disciplinary panel consisting exclusively of police
officials decides the guilt or innocence of the
accused. This raises serious questions about the
objectivity of these hearings.
Out of the 573 cases studied, 331 were referred by
the ICD to the police for specific action. The
majority of these (187) were referred to the police
for investigations or for further investigations
monitored by the ICD.  In 131 referred cases
specific recommendations were made in terms of
departmental steps (disciplinary action). In some
cases a single referral was for both criminal and
departmental prosecutions. The remaining cases
were either referred to the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP) or, in spite of being closed as
substantiated, were closed by the ICD because
there were no real prospects of a successful
prosecution.
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In the process of communicating with the police
relating to the 331 referrals, the ICD wrote 761
letters and received only 439 in reply (i.e.
approximately 58 per cent). In 143 cases (referrals)
there were no written replies from the police. On
top of all the difficulties the police inaction creates
for the ICD, it also makes it impossible for ICD staff
to conclusively close their files in the affected
cases.  Based on this data it can only be concluded
that the police largely ignore the ICD. This is an
untenable situation and makes a farce of the
oversight function of the ICD.
Possible reasons for non-compliance
There are a number of possible reasons for the
non-compliance by the police. The primary reason
seems to be in the wording of section 53 of the
South African Police Service Act (1995), and in
particular the absence of an obligation to report to
the ICD in terms of referrals (particularly
recommendations). In this regard the wording of
section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998,
serves as an example of how the police can be
obligated to comply with recommendations.
Compliance does not mean that the
recommendation should be acted upon in the same
way as a directive, but that the police should at
least report the outcome of their actions to the ICD.
Should they decide to either take no action or to
take alternative action, they should be compelled
to inform the ICD both of the steps they have
taken, as well as the reasons for their decision.
Other possible reasons have to do with the
absence of a prescribed coordinating mechanism
and other forms of formal interaction between the
ICD and the police, e.g. formally appointed liaison
officials. Formal contact and coordination should
also help to solve many of the problems that relate
to distrust between members of the ICD and the
police.
Impact of ICD recommendations
For reasons discussed above it is difficult to assess
the impact of the ICD in terms of its
recommendations to the police. When there is only
a 58 per cent response to the ICD’s letters relating
to specific referrals, and when another 143 referrals
elicit no response at all from the police, it would
appear that the impact is relatively low. 
Lessons learnt from international experience
With the disparate range of civilian oversight
mechanisms that exist for police agencies across the
world, it is a challenge to find best practices that
can be regarded as universally acceptable. In the
United States, for example, there is an ongoing
debate as to whether, and to what extent, the
discretion of police chiefs in relation to disciplinary
action against police officials should be subject to
civilian oversight (Stone & Bobb 2002:1). However,
some good examples of civilian oversight are
provided in the Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative (CHRI) report ‘Police Accountability: Too
important to neglect, too urgent to delay’ (2005).
According to the CHRI Report (2005:62-63) some
countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Swaziland and
Mozambique) have no independent civilian
oversight structures, and in others (e.g. Malaysia
and Maldives) single structures exist. Countries such
as South Africa have more than one, viz. the
Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), although
the HRC will invariably refer all complaints against
the police to the ICD. In the Commonwealth thirty-
six countries have ombudsmen, twenty have human
rights institutions and only a few have dedicated
police complaints agencies.  Whereas ombudsmen
and human rights institutions have broader
mandates that may include oversight of the police,
police complaints institutions are dedicated to
investigating, reviewing and monitoring police-
related complaints.
According to the CHRI, ‘[e]xperience shows that
even independent oversight agencies with sufficient
resources and strong investigative powers have
proven ineffective if the police and government
routinely ignore their recommendations’ (CHRI
Report 2005:67). In conclusion, the CHRI Report
(2005:64) provides the following summary of the
minimum requirements for successful oversight
bodies:
• Independence: should be independent of the 
executive and the police and empowered to
report directly to parliament.
• Sufficient powers: should have the authority to 
independently investigate complaints and issue
findings. This requires concomitant powers to
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conduct hearings, subpoena documents and
compel the presence of witnesses including the
police. It should also be able to identify
organisational problems in the police and
suggest systemic reforms.
• Adequate resources: should have sufficient funds 
to investigate at least the more serious
complaints referred to it. Skilled human
resources to investigate and otherwise deal with
complaints should also be available.
• Power to follow up on recommendations: 
should be empowered to report its findings and
recommendations to the public, and to follow
up on actions taken by the police chief in
response to its recommendations. It should also
be able to draw Parliament’s attention to
instances where police take no action.
From the research findings listed previously, it is
obvious that civilian oversight of the police in South
Africa falls visibly short of the above guidelines. 
Recommendations
Implementing the following recommendations
would, in our view, allow the ICD to perform its
constitutional mandate effectively:
• For purposes of independence and credibility 
the ICD should report directly to parliament (a
special parliamentary committee or,
alternatively, the Portfolio Committee for Safety
and Security). Alternatively, the ICD should
report to a minister who is not also the minister
responsible for the police.
• If the above recommendation is accepted, a 
separate ‘Act of Parliament’ should be
developed for the ICD. Such an Act should
address the deficiencies in the ICD’s mandate,
especially the absence of an obligation on the
police to report back to the ICD in terms of
recommendations by the latter. It should also
provide for a ‘reasoned response’ from the
police in cases where recommendations are not
implemented or where alternative steps are
taken.
• If the above recommendations by the ICD to the 
police on action to be taken are not accepted,
Section 53 of the South African Police Service
Act (1995), should be amended to address the
deficiencies raised above.
• The Minister for Safety and Security (or 
parliamentary committee/alternative Minister)
should consider the issuing of regulations in
terms of the above Act (or new Act) to regulate
cooperation and coordination between the ICD
and the police. The regulations can provide,
inter alia, for coordinating structures at
provincial (and national) level; the appointment
of liaison officials within both the ICD and the
police; and additional guidelines to fill
procedural gaps in the Act. 
• Provision should be made, either in the Act or in 
the regulations, for regular ICD inspections at
police offices to determine the outcome and
impact of ICD recommendations. In this regard
a form of cooperation with the police’s internal
inspectorate should also be considered.
• Care should be taken not to make ICD 
recommendations obligatory, but to ensure that
the police provide acceptable reasons for non-
compliance or alternative action if
recommendations from the ICD are not
implemented.
• ICD policy should set out the conditions and 
circumstances for both taking over investigations
from the police, and referring investigations to
the police. This should include monitoring and
reporting on such investigations. This may
relieve the ICD’s case load. 
• The ICD should provide for in-service training at 
police stations that should include how
information is shared about the purpose,
structure and functioning of the ICD. In
addition, the ICD should be involved in the
development of training curricula for the police
and the provision of relevant formal training at
police training colleges.
Conclusion
It can be concluded from this study that the ICD is
not completely toothless – consider, for instance,
the legal obligation on the police to report Class I
incidents to the ICD, and the referral of criminal
offences by the ICD to the Director of Public
Prosecutions for further action. However, if it is to
perform its constitutional mandate effectively it
certainly needs more and sharper teeth, especially
with regard to disciplinary action against offending
police officials.
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